Toward an Institution-based View of Setting Up an FIE in China at the Regional Level by Xu, Yang
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Toward an Institution‐based View of 
Setting Up an FIE in China 
  at the Regional Level 
  
 MSc in Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
 
 
Yang Xu 
May 20, 2011 
  
 
 
 
 
 1
CONTENTS 
CONTENTS......................................................................................................................................1 
Acknowledgments.............................................................................................................................2 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................................3 
Abbreviations....................................................................................................................................4 
Figures ..............................................................................................................................................5 
Tables .............................................................................................................................................. 5 
1. Introduction...........................................................................................................................6 
2. Theoretical Framework .........................................................................................................9 
2.1. Industry- and Resource-based Views ....................................................................................9 
2.2. Institution-based Framework ..............................................................................................10 
3. Literature Review................................................................................................................13 
3.1. Cultural Distance......................................................................................................................13 
3.1.1. Cultural interpretations .......................................................................................................14 
3.1.2. Guanxi.................................................................................................................................17 
3.2. The Legal and Political System...........................................................................................18 
3.2.1. Foreign investment laws .....................................................................................................19 
3.2.2. Laws for other business organizations. ...............................................................................19 
3.3. Entry Modes........................................................................................................................20 
3.3.1. JVs.......................................................................................................................................21 
3.3.2. WFOEs................................................................................................................................22 
4. Research Methodology .......................................................................................................23 
5. Discussion and Analysis......................................................................................................27 
5.1. Research Question 1: Barriers.............................................................................................27 
5.2. Research Question 2: Location ...........................................................................................32 
5.3. Research Question 3: Entry Mode ......................................................................................37 
6. Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................42 
References.......................................................................................................................................43 
Appendix A.....................................................................................................................................48 
Appendix B. ....................................................................................................................................49 
Appendix C. ....................................................................................................................................51 
 
 
 
 
 2
Acknowledgments 
I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Truls Erikson, whose expertise 
in strategic management helped me acquire further insight into the institution-based 
strategy. I thank him for his support, suggestions and recommendations at every step 
of the thesis. 
I would like to thank Dag Bremnes who inspired me with his entrepreneurial of 
establishment of Skannex AS with a wonderful, radically innovative product, as well 
as provided me the opportunity to work for Skannex.  
Thanks to Olsen Siri Stabel, whose significant experience in management was of 
tremendous help. I also appreciate the cooperation and support of all the company 
managers in Norway who participated in this study. 
Lastly, I dedicate this thesis to my beloved parents. 
Yang Xu 
Oslo, Norway 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
Abstract 
Establishing a business in China has always been perceived as a challenge to foreign firms. In 
addition to the resource- and industry-based conditions, firms need to take into account the wide 
influence of Chinese organizations and cultural differences from home countries, as well as guanxi, 
a central Chinese business concept that refers to the benefits gained from social connections. 
While the Chinese legal and political system in the field of business has improved in recent years, 
this study adopts an institution-based framework to illustrate the constraints and strategies in 
setting up a foreign investment enterprise (FIE) in China from a Norwegian enterprise’s 
perspective. More specifically, since China suffers from substantial regional inequalities and levels 
of law enforcement thus vary widely, this study explores the regional levels of law enforcement in 
different provinces in China. In addition, this study analyzes the entry mode strategies based on 
formal and informal institutional considerations.  
The statistical data are from surveys of Norwegian small- and medium-sized enterprises (NSMEs) 
and secondary data collection. A case study is undertaken to discuss what actions NSMEs can take 
in setting up an FIE in China. The research reveals that NSMEs that are culturally remote from 
China need to better verify the legal requirements, adapt to the culture, and practice guanxi with 
relevant organizations to determine their best-fit entry mode strategy and location decision during 
the process of setting up an FIE in China.  
Key Research Questions: 
What are the formal and informal constraints of setting up an FIE in China? 
What elements need to be better considered when choosing an FIE location? 
What is the best-fit ownership-based entry mode for NSMEs? 
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1. Introduction 
China is the most populous country in the world, with more than 1.3 billion people. 
With rising incomes, China has become the largest single market. Since China’s 
economic reform policies began in 1978, the number of foreign investment 
enterprises (FIEs) in China has grown to 435,000, and around 480 of the Fortune 500 
companies have already set up subsidiaries there. In a 2002 survey by the World 
Investment Report (2003), China was the top foreign direct investment destination, 
displacing the United States for the first time in the investment plans of multinational 
enterprises. The combination of market size and economic growth has made China the 
most promising market in the world.  
The Ease of Doing Business Index is meant to measure laws and regulations that 
directly affect the opening of new businesses in a country. A higher score indicates the 
country has simpler regulations for starting business and stronger property rights 
protections. Out of 183 countries scored on the index in 2010, Norway ranked eighth 
and China 79th (World Bank, 2010). China’s lower ranking reflects both its relatively 
complicated business environment and its poor protection of intellectual property 
rights (IPR). Furthermore, China is a country with regional industrialized inequalities 
and uneven enforcement across regions (Chen and Zheng, 2008; Du et al., 2008a). 
Therefore, establishing a foreign subsidiary in China is not to be done overnight, 
given the differences in culture, regulations and behavior. 
The conventional literature emphasizes on the resource-based view (Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Barney, 1986) and industry-based view (Porter, 1980) as drivers of firm competence 
(Wei and Zhu, 2007; McGrattan, 2011). Peng et al. (2008) and Hoskisson et al. (2000) 
have argued that institution-based theory has valuable potential in advancing insight 
into organizational strategies in Asia. Therefore, this paper adopts the 
institution-based theory to identify the main challenges of Norwegian SMEs (NSMEs) 
in setting up an FIE in China, as shown in Figure 1.1. Moreover, this paper proposes 
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an entry mode strategy for NSMEs through studying current Chinese rules and 
regulations, introducing Chinese culture, and illustrating the Chinese core business 
idea of guanxi, which refers to the benefits gained from social connections (Chen and 
Chen, 2004). In addition, by analyzing regional levels of law enforcement and IPR 
protection in different provinces, this research also provides NSMEs a ranking of the 
levels of law enforcement in different regions of the PRC.  
Figure 1.1. The resource-, industry-, and institution-based modes. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the resource-, industry-, and 
institution-based views, emphasizing institution-based theory and adopting it as the 
main framework. Section 3 reviews the institution-based literature. Section 3.1 
introduces the Chinese culture and norms and highlights the cultural disparity between 
Norway and China. Section 3.2 illustrates the Chinese legal and policy system, 
including foreign investment laws, laws regarding business organizations and 
intellectual property, and regional law enforcement. Section 3.3 elaborates the 
ownership-based entry mode. Section 4 presents the methodology: A 
questionnaire-based survey is used to identify the barriers of NSMEs and a case study 
is used to determine what actions NSMEs can take under practical circumstances to 
successfully set up an FIE in China. Secondary data collection was used to analyze 
the entry mode strategy and location choice. Section 5 resolves three key research 
questions regarding setting up an FIE in China: identifying formal and informal 
constraints, ranking regional levels of law enforcement and IPR protection, and 
analyzing the best-fit ownership-based entry mode for NSMEs. Section 6 presents the 
conclusion. Figure 1.2 illustrates this paper’s analysis and strategy-finding process.  
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Figure 1.2. Analysis and strategy-finding process. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
The institution-based view emphasizes analysis of the dynamic interactions between 
institutions and firms in terms of rules, laws, regulations and a wide range of social 
norms. A firm makes its strategic choices based on interactions between institutions 
and its own organization, and such “institutional matters” reinforce the firm’s strategic 
choice. This approach comprises institution-based theory, essentially a key 
complement to the industry-, and resource-based views (Peng, 2000, 2009; Cui and 
Jiang, 2010). 
2.1. Industry- and Resource-based Views 
Competitive firms need to observe the markets and new technology continuously. To 
attain and sustain a competitive advantage in a rapidly changing environment, a firm 
must achieve and reinforce its core capabilities (Wang and Ahmed, 2007). Porter’s 
(2008) five forces—described as entry barriers, rivalry between firms, pressure from 
substitute products or services, the bargaining power of suppliers, and the bargaining 
power of buyers—comprise the basic framework for the industry-based strategy to 
identify the main rivalries among the competitors (Peng, 2000). 
Figure 2.1. Industry- and resource-based views. 
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As Figure 2.1 shows, the industry-based view primarily emphasizes a firm’s external 
opportunities and threats in the industry, while the resource-based view concentrates 
on its internal strengths and weaknesses (Peng, 2000). The resource-based view, 
centering on the firm’s internal resources and capabilities, is used to identify its key 
drivers. Moreover, evaluation of the firm’s core internal competences is a key element 
behind decisions to internationalize (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Lee et al., 2008).  
However, Peng (2000) has argued that the industry- and resource-based views do not 
take context into consideration. Priem and Butler (2001) also criticized the 
industry-based view for its inability to gain deep insight into “what is behind such a 
rivalry” (p. 32), and the resource-based view for its “little effort to establish 
appropriate contexts” (p. 32). Brouthers and Werner (2008) argued that “the valuable, 
rare, hard-to-imitate and non-substitutable resources and capabilities in one context 
may become non-valuable, common, and easy to imitate in other social contexts” 
(p.190). Therefore, the institution-based view, covering institutional matters that 
govern individual and firm behaviors, has emerged as an increasingly popular market 
strategy, especially when exploring emerging economies, where the rules and 
culture-related context differ strikingly from those of developed economies (Peng, 
2000).  
2.2. Institution-based Framework 
Figure 2.2 shows that the institution-based framework is made up of formal 
institutions, including laws, rules and regulations, together with informal institutions, 
including norms and cultures (Peng, 2009). The law is a system that consists of rules 
and regulations, generally regulating a set of institutions. Rules usually refer to an 
organization’s standards or structures, and regulations are used to supervise 
individuals’ behaviors and organizations’ activities according to rules. A political and 
legal system refers to the legitimacy, justice, and execution of enforcing laws, rules, 
and regulations (Krygier, 2005). From a formal perspective, political and legal 
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systems provide “protection from external threats, and govern the allocation of valued 
resources among the members of a society” while laws and rules “permit or limited 
specified actions when doing business” (Cavusgil et al., 2008, pp.165, 185). More 
specifically, institutions control and leverage legal systems in politics (e.g., corruption 
and democracy), law (e.g., foreign investment and IPR laws), and regulations (e.g., 
marketing and distribution regulations). 
Figure 2.2. Institution-based theory. 
Institution-Based Framework
Laws & Rules
Formal, Informal
Cultures Norms
Regulations
Institution 
Uncertainty
 
The informal aspects of the institution-based view include cultures and social norms. 
Culture refers to the “learned, shared, and enduring orientation patterns in a society” 
(Cavusgil et al., 2008, p. 126) that influence all dimensions of styles, values, norms, 
and social behaviors. Norms usually refer to the values, beliefs, attitudes, and 
behaviors within a society that are often expressed through non-verbal behavior. 
Informal constraints — characterized by unfamiliar languages, values, norms, 
behaviors, and perceptions—shape a firm’s market entry strategy in a different 
cultural environment (Cavusgil et al., 2008).  
Institutions are commonly third parties, such as government bureaus and 
organizations, that enforce laws and rules to direct and govern the business activities 
(North, 1990; Peng et al., 2008). Peng (2009) argued that the institutions also play a 
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key role in reducing uncertainty in what is considered an informal, personal 
relationship-based exchange. To pursue a firm’s interests in case of formal constraints, 
managers and entrepreneurs usually resolve such constraints through informal 
relationships within a regional institutional framework (Peng, 2009). As a result, 
institutions are gradually becoming recognized as “more than background conditions” 
(p.100), that directly decide a firm’s core competence in terms of planning and 
implementing strategy, as well as increasing its competitive advantages. 
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3. Literature Review 
3.1. Cultural Distance 
Cultural distance refers to the dissimilarities between different countries or societies 
in terms of how an individual makes sense of the values, norms and behaviors 
according to his or her own cultural standards so as to affect the transfer of working 
practices and methods from one country to another (Hofstede, 1984, 1991; Peng et al., 
2008). Once a firm extends its business operations outside the borders of its own 
developed economy and the dominance of its regional culture, its foreignness 
becomes an inherent disadvantage due to the problems understanding the host 
country’s culture (Fatehi, 1996; Peng et al., 2008). In addition, all aspects of 
commercial behavior, such as communications, interactions, and negotiations, are 
culture bound (Xu and Shenkar, 2002). Domestic companies have a cultural 
advantage over their foreign competitors because of their intensive knowledge of the 
norms, unwritten laws, and social regulations in their home market (Ghauri and Fang, 
2001; Jensen and Szulanski, 2004). Therefore, organizational culture plays an equally 
important role in commercial performance (Pothukuchi et al., 2002; Ambler et al., 
2009). Foreign managers from different cultural background who are unable to 
understand non-verbal or implicitly expressed information are likely to do poorly in 
business negotiations (Kirkbride et al., 1991; Tian, 2007).  
Moreover, Chinese culture itself has regional differences. Ghauri and Fang (2001) 
pointed out the cultural differences in three regions: Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Guangzhou. The (northern) people of Beijing are perceived as sometimes dull and 
lacking a sense of humor; the (eastern) people of Shanghai are perceived as 
industrious and hard working; and the (southern) Guangzhou people are considered 
stylish, outgoing, and sometimes brash. Therefore, it is becoming increasingly 
necessary to identify and understand Chinese cultural characteristics. The next section 
introduces two analytical approaches to explore the cultural distance between Norway 
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and China. 
3.1.1. Cultural interpretations  
There are two models for explaining cultural differences across countries. The first 
was developed by Hofstede (1984), whose method of identifying cultural dimensions 
is by far the most influential in the literature. The second model was introduced by 
anthropologist Edward T. Hall (1976), and is characterized by “high- and low-context 
culture”. It has gained importance because of its ability to determine the cultural 
interactions between East Asia and the rest of the world (Cavusgil et al., 2008).  
Figure 3.1, adapted from Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, shows a five-dimensional 
index that explains the cultural differences between Norway and China. The following 
describes the five dimensions in question. 
Figure 3.1: Five cultural dimensions, adapted from Hofstede’s cultural dimensions.                   
   
Power and inequality (PDI). The PDI dimension for China is 80; by comparison, that 
for Norway is only 31. A higher PDI ranking means that the society suffers from a 
higher level of inequality in power and wealth (Hofstede, 2007). In China, the social 
structure is hierarchical and individuals with decision-making power usually have a 
high position and represent authority (Schilling and Chiang, 2009).  
Individualism or collectivism (IDV). China has a low IDV score of 20, while Norway 
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has a high score of 69. China is a country that has been strongly marked by 
collectivism, while, on the contrary, Norway represents a typical individualistic 
society. A collectivist society such as China’s has a strong loyalty toward groups, and 
its people are often “motivated by norms and duties imposed by the in-group, and try 
to emphasize their connectedness with the in-group” (Yan, 2009, p. 28; Kacen and 
Lee, 2002). In other words, a group that combines strong relationships is 
characterized by strong loyalty. Therefore, the business relationships in China tend to 
be stabler than in other countries, since distributors and dealers or other business 
partners do not frequently change, and managers find it hard to change suppliers and 
dealers for fear of breaking the relationships.  
Masculinity (MAS). A high MAS dimension reflects a high degree of gender 
differentiation. China has an MAS score of 55, indicating that it is a society that 
discriminates tremendously against females (Carletti, 2008). There are thus distinct 
differences between the roles of men and women in China, with men taking on most 
of the responsibility and power positions and women playing only a limited role, 
especially in rural areas. On the contrary, Norway takes into account the principle of 
gender equality, resulting in a society with parity between men and women. 
Uncertainty avoidance index (UAI). This criterion represents the level of “tolerance of 
a society towards uncertainty and ambiguity when facing situations that have no 
frame or structure” (Carletti, 2008). A higher ranking indicates a lower tolerance for 
such uncertainty and ambiguity, with individuals working under strict rules and 
procedures (Hofstede, 2007; Carletti, 2008). The UAI dimension for Norway is 50, 
which indicates a country with fewer rules and standards that are more open to new 
values, ideas, and behaviors. By comparison, China’s UAI score is 32. It thus appears 
that China is an even more liberal country than Norway; however, the dimension’s 
original meaning does not apply, since it only means in this case that China is a 
society with a more informal relationship-based (guanxi) framework of unwritten 
rules and procedures for structuring behavior. 
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Long-term orientation (LTO). The LTO dimension for China is 118, while that for 
Norway is much lower, at 20. This indicates that China’s society believes in long-term 
attitudes and commitments and respects tradition (Hofstede, 2007). This is why it 
takes a relatively long time to close a business deal when a Western company 
negotiates with Chinese partners.  
In sum, China’s culture is marked by respect for traditions and loyalty, which makes 
the Chinese tend to obey senior individuals in higher positions. Men wield the 
decision-making power in most organizations, and the Chinese favor the interests of 
the group and are particularly inclined toward long-term sustainable relationships.  
Figure 3.2. Countries ranked by context in Hall’s cultural model.   
The second model of cultural differences, that of Hall, 
distinguishes between cultures characterized as low context 
and high context (see Figure 3.2). A high-context culture 
refers to one with a great deal of implicit information hidden 
in the communication process, whereas a low-context 
culture means that most of its information is expressed 
openly and specifically (Pethö and Heidrich, 2004). In a 
high-context country such as China, people tend to have 
long-term relationships emphasizing loyalty. People in a 
low-context society such as Norway’s, however, tend to 
follow rules and standards and are usually highly task oriented 
(Pethö and Heidrich, 2004). Therefore, when enterprises from a low-context country 
enter a foreign market with a high-context culture, managers will face difficulties 
understanding the contextual information correctly due to the large amounts of 
unspoken information. 
Hofstede’s and Hall’s methods provide a general guide of cultural differences between 
Norway and China. To further explore Chinese high-context and relationship-oriented 
Edward T. Hall Mode
Context Culture
Korean
Japanese
Chinese
Arab
Latin Americans
Spanish
Italian
Russian
French
Australian
English Canadian
English 
American
Scandinavian
German
High Context
Low  Context
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culture, the next section introduces the typically Chinese core business idea of guanxi, 
which refers to the benefits gained from social connections. Indeed, the concept of 
guanxi is identified as key to “get anything important accomplished in China” (Fan, 
2002; Tian, 2007, p. 312). 
3.1.2. Guanxi 
Guanxi refers to an interpersonal connection or relationship between two individuals 
in which one counts on the other to maintain a long-lasting institution or gain a favor 
in terms of an informal mutual commitment (Chen and Chen, 2004). Ambler et al. 
(2009) determined the depth and effectiveness of guanxi in interpersonal relationships 
between two individuals as built on durability, reliability, and extensibility. Durability 
means the relationship will be maintained unconditionally for the long term. Hardness 
refers to the closeness of an interpersonal relationship with a decision marker of high 
hierarchical authority. Extensibility refers to the fact that existing acquaintances in a 
guanxi network can indirectly link one to further relationship networks, thus 
developing another guanxi interpersonal relationship. Since a Chinese government 
official in a guanxi network can be more powerful than the legal system itself in most 
cases, building guanxi with key officials in local governments is a potential solution 
to obstacles in doing business in China. With durable and reliable guanxi in an 
organization, a company is able to gain greater competitive advantage in the Chinese 
market (Tian, 2007).  
Practicing guanxi with local governments involves exchanges of favors and gifts. It is 
common practice for managers to visit government officials with gifts such as wine, 
cigarettes, and jewelry; however, when such behavior violates bureaucratic norms, it 
inevitably leads to corruption (Fan, 2002; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2004; Tian, 
2007). Therefore, guanxi can be a very difficult concept for foreign companies to put 
into practice in terms of obligations prescribed by laws and rights, especially for 
Westerners from low-context societies (Ambler et al., 2009). In short, Norwegian 
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SMEs setting up FIEs in China need to understand this core business concept, build 
guanxi relationships in a business network, and appropriately balance guanxi practice.  
3.2. The Legal and Political System 
A legal and political system provides a framework for laws and rules to define 
standards, limit specified behaviors among individuals and organizations, and prohibit 
violations to maintain stability. Its basic function is to govern the allocation of valued 
property and legal rights among the citizens. Each country has its own characteristic 
legal and political system created by its unique history, cultural context, and economic 
scale (Cavusgil et al., 2008). The Chinese legal and political system is characterized 
by “substantial devolution of administrative power from the central government to 
regional administrations” (Du et al., 2008a, p. 413). The central government retains 
the political power to appoint regional government officials and promote those with 
superior economic performance. To ensure better regional economic performance, 
regional authorities compete with each other by providing preferential policies, 
increasing government efficiency, smoothing and intervening in business operations, 
and enforcing IPR protection.  
Cavusgil et al. (2008) summarized the two common risks of doing business in 
emerging economics: firstly, political instability due to corruption and weak legal 
frameworks and, secondly, laws safeguarding IPR not being enforced or a painfully 
slow judicial process. In addition, Cavusgil et al. (2008) stated that political actions 
can harm business interests with “heavy government intervention, corruption and 
barriers to trade and investment, administrative delays, lack of legal safeguards for 
IPR, legislation unfavorable to foreign firm, economic failures and mismanagement” 
(p.11). The literature has also noted that the degrees of corruption, law enforcement 
(Cole et al., 2009), and IPR protection (Cheung and Lin, 2004) vary strikingly across 
Chinese regional authorities.  
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3.2.1. Foreign investment laws  
Chinese company law governs two types of corporations, limited liability companies 
and joint stock companies, and regulates their organization and operation in terms of 
legitimate rights, registered capital (share capital) requirements, and company and 
shareholder interests. Chinese company law states that foreign direct investments in 
China require investors to operate any FIEs through a limited liability company 
(Company Law of the PRC, 2006).  
The new company law of China, became effective in January 2006 and completely 
revised the statutes regarding limited liability companies, reducing and simplifying 
minimum registered capital requirements and thus greatly decreasing the FIE 
threshold (Dickinson et al., 2007). The old company law imposed minimum registered 
capital requirements of 500,000 CNY for an FIE in the manufacturing and wholesale 
trade businesses, 300,000 CNY for an FIE in retail sales, and 100,000 CNY for an FIE 
in a service businesses. However, the new company law sets the minimum registered 
capital for an FIE with two or more shareholders in any type of business activity at 
30,000 CNY. For an FIE with a single shareholder, the minimum registered capital is 
100,000 CNY (New Company Law, 2006). As a result, the initial capital for starting 
an FIE is lower, which is more likely to entice SMEs and single investors to enter into 
China's booming economy. 
3.2.2. Laws for other business organizations 
The government imposes laws and regulations on how firms should conduct their 
production, marketing, manufacturing, and distribution (Cavusgil et al., 2008). An FIE 
must obtain a mandatory conformance license or certification for its products or 
services through a related industrial or commercial bureau before conducting certain 
business activities. For example, imported medical devices must obtain a State Food 
and Drug Administration (SFDA) certification, and electronic devices must receive a 
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China Compulsory Certification similar to the European CE mark before they can be 
sold in China. Such restrictions can reduce a firms’ efficiency, effectiveness, or both 
due to lengthy and complicated applications. In addition, the Chinese government 
may devise complex regulations to limit the options for an entry mode. For example, 
it requires that foreign investors in the telecommunications market, for instance, first 
enter into a joint venture (JV) with a local firm before any other business undertakings. 
The government’s goal is to thus ensure that China maintains control of certain 
industries, and benefits from the inward transfer of technology, knowledge, and 
capital.  
Intellectual property consists of patents, trademarks, designs and copyrights, which is 
often the basis of a firm’s competitive advantage and long-term performance. 
Companies go to great expense to protect their intellectual assets and maintain their 
core competence to develop and offer competitive products (Cavusgil et al., 2008). 
However, regulations that exist to protect intellectual property are hard to implement, 
especially for companies that internationalize through foreign direct investments 
(Masku, 1997). 
3.3. Entry Modes 
A firm’s mode of entry, that is, the operational organization it chooses to operate in a 
foreign market, affects all of its future decisions and operations in that country’s 
market (Kumar and Subramaniam, 1997). The three main types of FIE in China are 
described as follows: The first is a cooperative JV (CJV), which refers to a contractual 
agreement where a foreign company and a local company establish a new enterprise 
together and share its profits and risks. The foreign investments can be in the form of 
such intangible assets as patents, trademarks, or shares of the joint venture. The 
second type of FIE is an equity JV (EJV), which refers to a new enterprise established 
by a foreign company and a local company that share the profits and risks on the basis 
of their respective equity contributions. Foreign shares of the EJV type cannot 
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comprise less than 25% of the JV’s total shares. The third type of FIE is the wholly 
foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE), a foreign company that has established a new 
enterprise in China and holds all of its capital (New Company Law, 2006). 
The Direction Guide to Foreign Investment (2002) classifies Chinese industries into 
three basic categories to regulate foreign investments: encouraged projects, restricted 
projects, and prohibited projects. Foreign investment projects not included in either of 
these three categories fall into the category of permitted projects. All encouraged 
projects receive preferential tax treatment from relevant laws and administrative 
regulations. Restricted projects, however, must take the form of an EJV or CJV: in 
other words, an FIE must have a Chinese party as the controlling shareholder 
(Direction Guide to Foreign Investment, 2002). Typical examples of this can be found 
in, for example, the automobile, telecommunication, and financial sectors. Even 
though China has been a member of the World Trade Organization for a decade, 
certain industries, such as automobile manufacturing, must still follow regulations that 
stipulate that foreign enterprises must establish 50–50 JVs to operate in China. These 
rules have not changed in the past three decades (Tian, 2007). 
3.3.1. JVs 
In China, CJVs and EJVs are similar in many aspects of general management 
structure and governance procedures including the approval process, approval 
authorities, the format of agreements, tax breaks, and legal standing (Folta, 2005). 
Therefore, this paper hereafter calls both of these entry modes a JV. 
Starting with a JV enables firms to rapidly enter the market and network, reduce costs, 
and lower formal and informal institutional uncertainty (Folta, 2005; Khoury and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2007). Plafker (2007) stated that starting with a JV can deliver 
benefits that a foreign enterprise alone would require great amounts of time and 
money to match, including government contracts and support, as well as access to 
distribution channels, bank credit, and qualified labor or business operation licenses.  
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3.3.2. WFOEs 
Deng (2001) indicated that China has fundamentally changed the way it attracts 
foreign investments, with WFOEs becoming the dominant entry mode to its market. 
According to Yunshi and Jing (2005), the proportion of JV investments decreased 
from more than 50% before 1994 to 31.5% in 2000. Zhang (2001) and Deng (2001) 
noted that many foreign investors have chosen WFOEs as the preferred entry mode in 
recent years to avoid the problems associated with JVs. Firstly, an innovative 
advanced technology investment, especially if undertaken in a country with weak law 
enforcement, requires a high level of IPR protection, which the WFOE mode can 
provide. Secondly, investors are then able to deliver high levels of control with low 
dissemination risk, enabling foreign companies to react accurately and in a timely 
manner to China’s changing market dynamics.  
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4. Research Methodology 
Figure 4.1. The three-stage method. 
 
This paper follows the three-stage method indicated in Figure 4.1, consisting of a 
qualitative survey, a case study, and two quantitative studies. Firstly, the qualitative 
survey stage involved a focus group, individual interviews, and e-mail questionnaires 
to identify the institutional barriers of NSMEs entering the Chinese market. The 
questionnaires were answered by the focus group in individual interviews or by 
e-mails.  
The focus group was organized during the Norwegian–Chinese Chamber Commerce 
meeting on March 29, 2011. The participants were all members of the 
Norwegian–Chinese Chamber Commerce and consisted of 11 Norwegian managers, 
mainly from NSMEs. The largest enterprise had almost 50 employees, while the 
smallest has fewer than five. During the interviews within the focus group, all the 
participants stated they would face problems if they were to enter the Chinese market. 
All barriers cited were recorded and categorized into five groups as a reference. 
In a second step, an open question, “What do you perceive to be the largest barrier to 
entering the Chinese market?” with barrier choice references gathered from the focus 
group, was randomly e-mailed to the representatives of 30 NSMEs. Only one replied 
by May 1. Another 13 questionnaires were taken in face-to-face interviews during the 
 24
break in the meeting of the Chinese Professionals in Norway on March 30. The 
interview participants were from the information technology and solar energy sectors. 
Another 18 questionnaires were taken during individual interviews in April. The total 
number of questionnaire respondents was 43. During the interviews, the author also 
asked the respondents to list any additional criteria considered to be a barrier; 
however, the items mentioned were similar to existing criteria. Table 5.1 identifies all 
the barriers cited and Table 5.2 lists the respondents’ backgrounds. 
Secondly, this paper is also an inductive study to determine successful entry strategies 
for NSMEs. Therefore, a case study approach has been adopted with an example of a 
firm, Skannex AS, successfully setting up an FIE in China. In-depth interviews were 
conducted with the chief executive officer (CEO) of Skannex AS on the topic of 
overcoming barriers to setting up an enterprise in China, revolving around the key 
issues of formal and informal constraints, entry location, and the best-fit entry mode 
for NSMEs. The interviews involved detailed reasons and methods related to entry 
strategy.  
Thirdly, China’s levels of law enforcement vary widely across regions, that is, 
provinces and province-level cities, even though it is a “unitary state with uniform de 
jure laws across the country” (Du et al., 2008, p.413). According to the Survey of 
China’s Private Enterprises (2002), Chinese economic reform has been accompanied 
by corruption over the past three decades. It is reported that more and more large 
multinational enterprises realize they have to bribe government officials in various 
ways to gain access to the Chinese market (Xu and Chen, 2009). Therefore, this paper 
measures China’s regional levels of law enforcement and IPR protection according to 
four indicators: IPR protection, government intervention, government corruption, and 
contract enforcement. The raw data for these indicators were adopted from Du et al. 
(2008). Regions with strong law enforcement are typically characterized by strong 
contract enforcement, weak government intervention, and low government corruption. 
The following indicators are presented (Du et al., 2008) and Appendix C shows the 
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original data and parameters. 
Indicator 1: The measure of IPR protection is the logarithm of the number of 
approved patents per capita (available from various issues of the China Statistical 
Yearbook). 
Indicator 2: Government intervention is the percentage of time enterprise managers 
spend dealing with government agencies and officials.  
Indicator 3: Government corruption is the proportion of private entrepreneurs 
answering yes to the question of whether stricter policies against government 
corruption in their region are necessary.  
Indicator 4: Contract enforcement is the proportion of private entrepreneurs answering 
affirmatively to the question of whether they would use the courts to resolve business 
disputes. 
This paper uses indicator 1, IPR protection, to measure the regional level of IPR 
protection. The regional levels of law enforcement are measured, respectively, by 
indicators 2, 3, and 4. 
This paper adopts the standard value ij jij
j
x
z
μ
σ
−=  to compute the levels of 
regional IPR protection and law enforcement, where ijz  is the standard value of 
indicator j  in region i , ijx  represents the raw data of indicator j  in region i  to 
be standardized, 
jμ  is the mean of indicator j , and jσ  is the standard 
deviation of indicator j . Then, the level of IPR protection in region i  is given by 
1
1
i
i
xIPR z
μ
σ
−=（ ） , and the level of law enforcement in region i  is given by  
4 2 3
3( )
i i i
i
z z zLE z − −= . The general regional ranking of law enforcement with 
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IPR protection in region i  is given by ( )i iiLE z IPR zV = +（ ） . 
Fourthly, since another main aim of this study is to provide NSMEs with an objective 
view of an entry mode under practical business circumstances, second-hand data on 
the ownership-based entry mode were collected from Norwegian subsidiaries in China. 
The profile of each company was obtained from Innovation Norway’s Norway 
Related Companies Directory 2008–2009. 
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5. Discussion and Analysis 
In consideration of this study’s research questions, this section presents a successful 
example of entry into the Chinese market as a separate case study. More specifically, 
this paper combines the case study with the results of the questionnaire and 
quantitative research to discuss and analyze the formal and informal barriers, FIE 
location choices, and ownership-based entry modes. 
Skannex, a world-leading provider of bioassay reader solutions in point-of-care 
testing and rapid testing, was founded in 2006 in Hønefoss, Norway. Skannex 
operates with nine employees and a three-member management board. In 2010, the 
company had a 2 million NOK annual turnover. Its founder, Dag Bremnes (chief 
technology officer), stated that they had realized the important role of China, a huge 
market for clinical diagnostics and food and feed safety at the foundational stage. As a 
result, in February 2011, Skannex set up a branch office in the biotechnology 
incubator at Changzhou National High-Tech Science Park, Changzhou, Jiangsu 
province. Because of its young age and small size, Skannex is able to represent most 
Norwegian high-tech SMEs with limited resources. The following is from interviews 
with the CEO of Skannex AS, Olsen Siri Stabel. 
5.1. Research Question 1: Barriers 
Table 5.1. Obstacles to entering the Chinese market. 
 The Obstacle/barrier Frequency Frequency 
percentage 
1 Political risk 16 37.2 
2 Weak judicial enforcement 19 44.2 
3 Complicated regulations and 
procedures 
28 65.1 
4 Language barrier/cultural distance 39 90.7 
5 Difficulty obtaining information  35 81.4 
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Table 5.2. Respondents’ backgrounds.  
No. of 
employees 
Percentage 
of 
respondents 
Industry Percentage 
of 
respondents
Fewer than 10 38.1 Manufacturing 14.3 
11–50 45.2 Chemicals 26.2 
51–100 11.9 Information 
technology 
33.3 
101–250 4.8 Solar energy 9.5 
More than 250 0 Others 16.7 
Total  100  100 
Barrier 1: Political risk 
The questionnaire produced mixed results for political risk, with 37.2% of the 
respondents regarding it as the main barrier to entering China. Some managers in the 
focus group mentioned the controversy surrounding last fall’s Nobel Peace Prize. 
Large enterprises have suffered losses from the Chinese government’s sudden recent 
interventions: For example, Statoil may be a victim of the Peace Prize fallout, since a 
deal to sell part of its shares of an oil field off Brazil to Sinochem of China has been 
delayed. Political contact between Norway and China has been severed, a free trade 
agreement is on ice, and China recently blocked imports of Norwegian salmon by 
imposing strict new veterinary controls. In addition, Chinese authorities suddenly 
revoked DNV’s license to conduct certification operations in China. This means DNV 
can no longer certify imports and exports in China, and around 300 Chinese 
employees can no longer work for it. Nonetheless, the political environment in China 
is much better than it has ever been, and the current political tension between Norway 
and China is seen as temporary and short term. 
Barrier 2: Weak judicial enforcement  
Weak judicial enforcement was considered a main obstacle by 44.2% of respondents. 
Some managers mentioned ambiguities and uncertainties in the legislation. For 
example, one manager’s e-mail mentioned a trademark problem: “How to measure 
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similarity for the infringement of a trademark? The trademark law does not specify 
the criteria by which similarity is measured, which makes it very difficult to enforce 
the law in practice.” Another manager, whose company has many patents, argued, 
“Chinese is generous, they use foreign technology, assembling it, copying it, servicing 
it and customizing it into their own.” 
Barrier 3: Complicates regulations and procedures 
A total of 65% of the respondents perceived complicated regulations and procedures 
as a major barrier in starting business. For example, one manager stated, “I was told 
that China’s regulation system is much more complete with a lot of procedures, the 
procedures will change and very complicated.” Respondents also do not have a 
network to help navigate through information on business regulations, such as 
company law, tax policies, marketing and distribution regulations, and other aspects, 
such as accounting, payroll, and profit repatriation: “It is time-consuming, a 
complicated procedure, especially dealing with Chinese authorities.” They also did 
not understand the government’s decision-making hierarchy, to determine who 
decides what at which level. 
The first issue in setting up an enterprise in China is associated with administrative 
procedures. However, inefficiencies in government bureau coordination, vague 
procedures and laws, and the uncertainty that arose when NSMEs started to register 
companies in China are illustrated in the following interview with Skannex’s CEO: 
The legal framework, if you know it, you could do business in China or be able 
to distribute in China, making contracts, an attorney, to make sure that we are 
into the Chinese regulation and also the SFDA approves. All the paper 
documents should be prepared. You need to find somebody who can be trusted. 
The procedure is not so clear. That is really annoying. The local government 
often does not have a standard, or they have different standards; we have to 
meet their requirement and change such documents again and again. 
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Barrier 4: Language barrier/ cultural distance 
Section 3.1 has described the cultural differences between China and Norway, and 
leaves no doubt that the greatest barrier for NSMEs (at 90.7%) is the different culture, 
languages, religions, and ethics. Linguistic barriers plus cultural differences make it 
difficult for NSMEs to understand Chinese people. Translations are rarely, if ever, 
precise. One manager stated that you need a cultural background to interpret what 
Chinese people actually mean when they say OK. The Chinese are seldom 
straightforward in their speech and can actually be expressing disagreement when 
they say OK, which most Westerners will fail to correctly interpret. The Chinese are 
much more likely to say that something is different or that they do not fully agree in 
an ambiguous and implicit response. Similarly, a cultural background is essential in 
interpreting brand names, logos, slogans, and so forth.  
Understanding the key drivers of Chinese business behavior is important, and Asians 
and Westerners have very different models of thinking (Nisbett, 2003). Much of their 
divergent cultural differences are attributed to contrasting philosophical, historical, 
and linguistic origins, as explained by Skannex’s CEO: 
Business to business all over the world, that is still culture. Language, to me, 
that is impossible to understand. This is very important; we are not speaking 
Chinese. To overcome the barriers, the main point is to find somebody to 
understand the culture and the Chinese negotiation style. If we use our model to 
negotiate, it will fail, I don’t know how to find such a person, but we have 
something. 
Chinese students studying abroad are particularly excellent resources, since they can 
be helpful to some extent by sharing the guanxi that they and their family may have. 
Additionally, these foreign-trained students can also make up the managerial talent 
that China lacks (Cremer and Ramasamy, 2009). 
Barrier 5: Difficulty obtaining information and knowledge 
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Difficulty obtaining information and knowledge is the second greatest barrier 
confronted by managers (81.4%). What types of information are NSMEs expecting? 
One interviewee argued that business in China is less risky for large companies since 
they have a larger pool of resources and money to obtain what they need. For example, 
NSMEs need advice on startup issues such as legal matters, local business partners, or 
Chinese business friends (guanxi). They also need to gather information, make a 
business plan, estimate a budget, and go through the process of establishing business. 
In China, NSMEs do not know where to obtain this information or how to meet 
people experienced in China-related affairs, unlike in Norway, a low-context country, 
where knowledge is public and easily accessible. For example, almost all of Norway’s 
legal framework can be accessed through an official English-language website. In a 
high-context country, however, procedures are not always documented and formal 
information is hidden. The Chinese official website provides related rules and 
regulations only in Chinese, and even if certain rules are published in English, they 
may be out of date. While large enterprises can hire professional consultants to plan 
their business start properly, SMEs can seldom afford it. 
Skannex AS is a member of Innovation Norway, a group that provides professional 
services, including a legal consultancy and a public relations and marketing 
consultancy. Innovation Norway has set up operations in China and already extended 
support services to its clients who want to expand business between Norway and 
China. Such home government platforms are important to Skannex in gaining general 
legal information, and other sources of information could consist of information 
specialists, the home government, the home embassy in China, home country 
professionals and businesses, dedicated trade bodies, and the Internet (Ambler et al., 
2009). 
Table 5.3 lists some current studies on institution-based challenges when entering the 
Chinese market. According to Blackman (1999), Shaukat and Wei (2005), and Cremer 
and Ramasamy (2009), the political and legal environment is the main barrier 
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confronted by multinational enterprises, which is because the samples consist of large 
companies. However, our findings are largely consistent with those of Schilling and 
Chiang (2009), who stated that the main challenges are gathering information, 
business cultural distance, and rule enforcement. The findings from the questionnaire 
imply that NSMEs’ lack of an information channel associated with administrative 
issues is due to cultural barriers. 
Table 5.3. Overview of the literature on institution-based challenges. 
Author and 
Year 
Sample  
and Country 
Industry/ 
employees 
Challenges identified 
ranked from high to low 
Shaukat and 
Wei, 2005 
22, EU, Asia, US Manufacturing
120–40,000 
Political stability 
Regulation not strictly implemented 
Incomplete legal system 
Cremer and 
Ramasamy, 
2009 
50, New Zealand Largest 
company  
listed in New 
Zealand 
Magazine 
Legal environment 
Political stability 
Bureaucracy and red tape 
Guanxi with authorities 
Protection of intellectual property 
Schilling and 
Chiang, 2009 
Germany SMEs Gathering information 
Business cultural distance 
Formal rules enforcement 
Information/process asymmetries 
Blackman, 
1999 
14, US Power plant 
company 
Ambiguity of relevant laws 
Delay of approval process 
Control of rate of return 
Enforcement of contracts 
 
5.2. Research Question 2: Location 
Skannex established an FIE in the Changzhou biotechnology incubator in National 
High-Tech Science Park. Changzhou is the third largest city in Jiangsu province, 
located in the center of the Yangtze River delta’s economic belt, and it is only one 
hour from Shanghai by high-speed rail. The Changzhou National High-Tech Science 
Park was built jointly by the Jiangsu Education Department, the Technology 
Department, and the Changzhou People’s Municipal Government. The main reason 
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for setting up an FIE in Changzhou was illustrated by the CEO of Skannex as follows: 
Logistics for the product, a national culture available—there may be a lot of 
other resources for marketing that are available in the main city. Shanghai is 
still more popular than Beijing for setting up a company. I think the best reason 
for Skannex is finding people, the vice director of Changzhou National Science 
Park, and that incubator, the Changzhou biotechnology incubator, which was 
established in July 2010. If the local government officials can assist in meeting 
the vice director or other officials, it helps. We got connections from the vice 
director of the incubator and built our relationship; the trust got bigger and the 
director introduced Skannex to set up an FIE in the biotech incubator. 
In this newly established biotechnology incubator, Skannex enjoys a preferential 
policy of 100 square meters of workshop free for the first three years. The founder 
built guanxi with the director of the science park, who has the power to provide such a 
preferential policy to a foreign company. Skannex’s founder stated that the main point 
was to promote relations and increase good will. Although it took time to build trust 
with the incubator institution, Skannex kept in touch with the vice director of the 
incubator and asked questions about entry requirements, preferential policy, 
networking inside the incubator, and so forth. 
A newly established incubator or science park such as the Changzhou biotechnology 
incubator played an important role for Skannex in reducing operational costs and 
providing better support and social ties with the local government. Skannex also 
confirmed the incubator’s commitment whether they were willing to invite Skannex 
to join them, as explained by the CEO: “It is very important that the incubator is 
interested in us. Now we know we are the first foreign investment enterprise to start a 
WFOE in the Changzhou biotech incubator.” Although such preferential policies are 
usually provided only to domestic enterprises, NSMEs can gain such benefits if they 
have guanxi to build close relationships with the local government or individuals with 
decision making power. 
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There are numerous science parks in the 56 national high-tech zones that were 
co-established by local governments, and most enterprises in national science parks 
can be identified as high-tech companies that enjoy tax incentives. It is well known, 
however, that intellectual property is the largest legal minefield in commercial 
international relations with China. On the one hand, the serious intellectual property 
infringements in China reflect the lack of proactive and deterrent intellectual property 
enforcement, especially at the local level (Israel, 2006). On the other hand, whether 
government intervention ends up being a grabbing hand or a helping hand hinges 
critically on the cultural background of SMEs. Since NSMEs display great cultural 
disparity with China, they are more likely to view government intervention as a 
grabbing hand (Xu and Chen, 2009). In addition, the quality of legal institutions and 
degree of law enforcement vary significantly across regions. Whether a company will 
use the courts to resolve business disputes or infringements depends on its regional 
contract enforcement power. 
China amended its patent, trademark, and copyright laws in 2000 and 2001 and issued 
new IPR regulations and rules since 2002 (Ambler et al., 2009). However, the action 
plan of IPR protection varies in different regions. Some regional Chinese courts have 
set up a special division to hear intellectual property-related cases in an attempt to 
better protect IPR. Table 5.4 shows that Beijing, at 260% beyond the mean value, has 
the highest level of IPR protection, followed by Shanghai (189%) and Guangdong 
province (154%), whereas Gansu province (-125%) has the lowest level of IPR 
protection, preceded by Guizhou province (-119%) and Qinghai province (-105%). 
Foreign companies will not feel secure from counterfeiting, trademark infringement, 
and copyright piracy in regions with poor IPR protection (Tian, 2007). 
In addition, Norwegian and Chinese cultures are very disparate. The Norwegian 
government seldom intervenes in business operations and corruption is seriously 
forbidden. Since NSMEs have problems developing a deep understanding of China’s 
unwritten laws, cultural behavior, and social regulations, they will not be familiar with 
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such “informal” government behavior; however, foreign firms with cultural 
similarities may be able to benefit from such government help. Therefore, NSMEs are 
indeed at a disadvantage if they start their business in a region with a low level of law 
enforcement. 
Table 5.4. Regional ranking of law enforcement (LE) and IPR protection levels. 
Rank Region IPR LE V 
1 Shanghai 1.89 0.81 2.70 
2 Beijing 2.60 -0.24 2.36 
3 Guangdong 1.54 0.19 1.73 
4 Zhejiang 1.38 0.22 1.60 
5 Shandong 0.46 0.87 1.34 
6 Fujian 0.62 0.56 1.18 
7 Tianjin 1.39 -0.31 1.08 
8 Jiangsu 0.61 0.21 0.82 
9 Liaoning 0.96 -0.39 0.57 
10 Qinghai -1.05 1.36 0.31 
11 Inner Mongolia -0.59 0.66 0.06 
12 Hebei -0.28 0.28 0.00 
13 Shaanxi -0.32 0.28 -0.03 
14 Heilongjiang 0.19 -0.27 -0.08 
15 Ningxia -0.34 0.14 -0.20 
16 Hunan -0.34 0.05 -0.29 
17 Xinjiang -0.43 0.12 -0.31 
18 Yunnan -0.77 0.25 -0.52 
19 Henan -0.70 0.17 -0.54 
20 Gansu -1.25 0.49 -0.76 
21 Jiangxi -0.88 0.11 -0.77 
22 Sichuan -0.39 -0.42 -0.81 
23 Hubei -0.46 -0.44 -0.90 
24 Shanxi -0.73 -0.18 -0.91 
25 Jilin 0.18 -1.19 -1.01 
26 Guangxi -0.85 -0.32 -1.18 
27 Hainan -0.32 -0.90 -1.22 
28 Anhui -0.94 -0.34 -1.28 
29 Guizhou -1.19 -1.36 -2.54 
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In terms of law enforcement levels, Qinghai (136%), Shandong province (87%), and 
Shanghai (81%) are the top three among the 29 regions. Another six 
regions—Shaanxi (28%), Hebei (28%), Yunnan (25%), Zhejiang (22%), Jiangsu 
(21%), and Guangdong (19%)—are at the same level of positive law enforcement. 
However, Shanxi (-18%), Beijing (-24%), Heilongjiang (-27%), and Tianjin (-31%) 
are regions with negative levels of law enforcement, whereas Guizhou (-136%), Jilin 
(-119%), and Hainan (-90%) have the lowest degrees of law enforcement.  
Figure 5.1. Geographic distribution of Norwegian enterprises in China. 
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While most companies take advantage of the government’s behavior by handling 
business operations and disputes themselves, NSMEs starting a company in a poorly 
enforced region will create significant negative effects. Therefore, a strong index of 
law enforcement and IPR protection will positively affect SMEs’ entry locations when 
the cultural distance with China is great. Shanghai enjoys the highest score (270%), 
followed by Beijing (236%), Guangdong (173%), and Zhejiang (160%). Competent 
and professional regional government bureaucrats are also found in Shandong (134%), 
Fujian (118%), Tianjin (108%), Jiangsu (82%), Liaoning (57%), and Qinghai (31%). 
According to the Norway Related Companies Directory 2008–2009, as of February 
2010 there were 143 Norwegian enterprises in China within the main locations of 
Shanghai (63 units), Beijing (25 units), and Jiangsu province (19 units), revealing the 
current entry location trend of Norwegian enterprises. To summarize, this geographic 
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distribution indicates that most Norwegian enterprises invest in regions with high 
levels of IPR protection and law enforcement. Figure 5.1 illustrates the regional 
distribution of Norwegian enterprises in China. 
5.3. Research Question 3: Entry Mode 
All ventures, including WFOEs, rely on cooperation and collaboration with Chinese 
businesses and authorities. In China, foreign-owned businesses are always in 
partnership. Skannex attended a medical exhibition during the Shanghai Expo last 
September. During his three weeks in China, Dag Bremnes, Skannex’s chief 
technology officer, assessed the Chinese business environment and planned to start a 
branch office. However, what was the best-fit entry mode for Skannex? Was a WFOE 
the best option, or would a JV be more effective? Skannex first verified the legal 
requirements for starting a business in the medical field and forecast the operational 
costs of setting up an enterprise in China, as explained by the firm’s CEO:  
The laws and SFDA require our devices to obtain SFDA certificates before 
being sold in China. It takes at least one year from filing the document to get 
this. We probably will get SFDA certification and then get revenue in the 
second year. We made a budget for setting up an enterprise in China. It is half a 
million CNY for us. If it is up to one million, we will have trouble starting a 
WFOE because we are still financing our own Norwegian company. 
Although the new company law requires a minimum registered capital requirement of 
100,000 CNY, Skannex was able to afford 500,000 CNY. This capital was also an 
initial investment intended for use in the company’s operational expenses, such as 
payroll, office rent, and product purchases, and not as a deposit that must be placed in 
a bank and never used. 
Second, unlike starting with a JV, which can result in coordination problems, a WFOE 
as the entry mode can totally control and manage the task. It is easier to control, 
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operate, and manage WFOEs than JVs. The implementation of company policies 
within a subsidy is more effective, as explained by Skannex’s CEO: 
Having a link, maybe having our own people with the link, makes the gap 
much smaller. We can have people who can be trusted. I don’t think we will use 
a distributor; for one thing is not to cheat us, another is to understand our 
market, the product. We are still in the product development period. So we have 
to control what we want to accomplish. 
In addition, Skannex still felt a JV would be effective and could help quickly market 
product in China if it had the guanxi to find an experienced intermediary or trusted JV 
partner, as illustrated by the CEO’s comments: 
I still think we can go for a JV, and a lot of companies did that. You have an 
agreement for the issues that really matter. But we are a small enterprise. We 
did not have enough resources and experience to negotiate with a Chinese 
partner. To look at what happens is easy, to close a thing (deal) is difficult, to 
close and make a thing (deal) happen is difficult. All needs to be negotiated. To 
understand the culture and the negotiation culture is important. We have limited 
resources and experience. That is the disadvantage for us. Are the partners 
interested in a long-term negotiation or what is most important to them? Is it 
only price? To have a person knowledgeable about the Chinese to understand 
Chinese negotiations is important. I think we need an expert to help us to close 
the deal, and that is the important thing. 
Moreover, this paper reviewed related Norwegian companies profiles through their 
websites from the survey of the Norway Related Companies Directory 2008–2009. 
Most of the subsidies were established before 2002. The current number of employees 
of these Norwegian enterprises is not within the scope of NSMEs, and the exact 
number of their employees when they established their branch offices in China cannot 
be determine with certainty. This study only retained data classified as pertaining to 
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the technical, manufacturing, or industrial fields. 
This study analyzes the proportion of ownership-based entry modes among existing 
Norwegian subsidiaries (see Table 5.5). A potential sample size of 143 could be 
achieved but, due to missing values, the effective sample size was only 80. Table 5.5 
indicates that Norwegian enterprises prefer WFOEs (87.5%) as the entry mode. This 
proportion is similar to the findings of Table 5.6, a distribution analysis of JVs in 
industry in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
Table 5.5. Existing Norwegian JVs and WFOEs in China 
Region  JV WFOE Numbers  Employees Numbers 
Shanghai 3 29 32  0–50 15 
Beijing 2 14 16  50–250 36 
Jiangsu 2 8 10  500+ 29 
Guangdong 1 6 7  Total 80 
Liaoning 0 3 3     
Fubei 1 2 3      
Zhejiang  0 2 2     
Tianjin 0 2 2  Years   
Shangdong 0 1 1  Before 1990 3 
Fujian 0 1 1  1991–2002 41 
Sichuan 1 1 2  2003–2008 36 
Shanaxi 0 1 1     
Total 10 70 80  Total 80 
Table 5.6. Distribution analysis of JVs in industry in the PRC 
Type (%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2008 2009 
WFOE 46.9 50.3 60.2 62.4 66.8 81.5 80 
EJV 35.8 34,7 20.4 29.6 26.9 16.8 18.3 
CJV 15.9 15.9 12.9 7.2 5.2 1.7 1.6 
Table 5.6 indicates that WFOEs have become the dominant entry mode into the 
Chinese market. On the one hand, the new company law that took effect in 2006 
decreases the threshold of the WFOE entry mode by reducing the minimum registered 
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capital requirements. On the other hand, most Chinese regions, such as Liaoning, 
Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Jiangsu, are manufacturing areas. Starting with a WFOE 
entry mode can reduce the risks of disseminating proprietary know-how in the 
manufacturing process. However, laws and regulations still prohibit a foreign investor 
from starting a WFOE in certain industries. As discussed in Section 3.3, foreign 
enterprises must take the form of a JV or have a Chinese party as the controlling 
shareholder. Furthermore, if foreign firms lack the capabilities to integrate the culture, 
rules, and processes, they will probably face a high liability for their foreignness. A 
local partner in the JV entry mode can leverage internal and external guanxi to 
compensate for the disadvantages of foreignness, smoothing business operations. 
In sum, in certain industries, state-owned enterprises control the dominant distribution 
network, according to government policy. A JV can help NSMEs quickly market their 
products. Moreover, NSMEs can share the costs and risks with a local Chinese partner 
if the risks are high. A JV may also be favored by less experienced NSMEs to reduce 
cultural barriers through learning and acquiring resources from partners. However, the 
decline of the JV and the rise of the WFOE reflect, in a sense, the perception that 
China is no longer a high-risk country, and the cost of establishing and managing a 
WFOE is considered to be less than that of a JV. The main obstacle to engaging in a 
JV in China can be perceived as easy exposure to leakage and piracy once conflicts 
occur, making it difficult for NSMEs to control and protect their proprietary 
technology and know-how. In a sense, the popularity of WFOEs in a region with a 
high level of IPR protection and law enforcement reflects increased consideration in 
setting up FIEs in China. 
There is no general easy solution for NSMEs setting up business in China. Their entry 
strategy is first teased out by formal rules and regulations, which may deter NSMEs 
from expanding their technological resources and capabilities to enter the Chinese 
market. Firstly, NSMEs should understand the Chinese legal system and then get used 
to developing their own network (guanxi) to decrease the liability of their foreignness. 
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They can then find key individuals and expand their network while developing a deep 
understanding of China’s unwritten laws and cultural and social regulations and their 
impact. 
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6. Conclusion 
There are definite signs that the Chinese market is becoming tougher, and domestic 
enterprises more competent. However, China’s regulatory environment has greatly 
improved and is much better than it was 10 years ago. Government bureaucrats have 
become more competent and professional, though the legal system is still a far cry 
from current Western systems, where formal rules and regulations are a priority. There 
is also no substitute for guanxi in China. The two systems, the legal framework and 
that of relationships, operate in parallel and play an important role in setting up FIEs 
in China. The decision to enter the Chinese market is always fraught with risk. 
Therefore, NSMEs must have a much better understanding about legal and cultural 
conditions to ensure their entry strategy through guanxi. 
The outcome of this study is both theoretically and pragmatically justified. Industry- 
and resource-based conditions vary greatly; therefore, this study proposes a 
well-rounded framework within the context of institution-based theory. The 
institution-based method can be better summarized for market entry strategies, which 
depend on formal and informal considerations such as laws and regulations, culture, 
levels of law enforcement and IPR protection, and guanxi. 
The paper has examined the main barriers of NSMEs and summarized levels of IPR 
protection and law enforcement across regions. Results show that WFOEs may 
represent a better way to operate than JVs. However, all companies should be sure to 
use guanxi in advance. In China, politics and business go somewhat hand in hand due 
to the complexity of the many barriers to entry, and reliable guanxi with government 
agency officials can greatly smooth the process of setting up an FIE in China. 
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Appendix A.  
Survey Questionnaire 
Background 
Your company industry sector  
Number of employees Under 10 11-50 51-100 101-250 
 
Part A: What do you perceive to be the largest barrier to entering the Chinese market? 
This is a multiple-choice question, although it is also open, since you can add other answers and 
are not limited to the following: 
 
 
 
 
Barrier A: Difficulty in obtaining information and knowledge 
Barrier B: Political risk 
Barrier C: Weak judicial enforcement  
Barrier D: Complicated regulations and procedures 
Barrier E: Language barrier/cultural distance 
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Appendix B.  
Overview of Steps to Start a Business in China 
Table A.1. Main procedures for registering a foreign enterprise in China. 
1. Name registration with the State Administration of Industry and Commerce. 
2. Obtain certificate of approval from the Ministry of Commerce or Foreign Economical 
Cooperation Bureau 
3. Apply for a business license with the State Administration of Industry and Commerce. 
4. Obtain chops from the Public Security Bureau. 
5. Obtain organization code license from the Technical Supervision Bureau. 
6. Obtain tax certificate from the Taxation Bureau 
7. Registration and approval with the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. 
8. Open foreign currency and CNY bank accounts 
9. Inspect capital from the investor’s overseas bank account 
10. Obtain capital verification report notarized by a certified public accountant 
11. Apply for a permanent business license with the State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce. 
12. Register financial certificate 
13. Register statistics license 
14. Obtain import/export license (applicable for trading and manufacturing WFOEs only) 
Source: http://www.pathtochina.com/regcompany.htm 
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Table A.2. Documents should be submitted to the commercial authorities when setting up a wholly 
foreign-owned enterprise. 
1. Obtain application form to set up a foreign-funded project 
2. Get notified of approval for name registration 
3. Obtain certifications of the foreign investor's legal status and financial and credit standing from 
the Chinese embassy or the Chinese consulate overseas 
4. Obtain bank reference letters from the investor’s bank declaring good standing 
5. Obtain authorization letter 
6. Write up a project application report (feasibility study) 
7. Draw up the articles of association of the wholly foreign-funded enterprise 
8. Hire a Chinese legal representative and name a legal agent 
9. Obtain the written reply from the county-level government, or higher, in which the 
foreign-funded enterprise will be located (provide office address) 
10. Obtain other documents as promulgated by laws and regulations 
Note: Foreign investors in China are not allowed to directly submit application documents to 
incorporate WFOEs to the relevant authority and must retain a PRC representative authorized or 
permitted by relevant authorities to act as a sponsor. The sponsor submits all the documents to the 
examination and approval authorities on behalf of the foreign investor. 
Source: http://www.pathtochina.com/regcompany.htm 
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Appendix C. 
Indexes of China’s Regional Economic Institutions 
 
 
 
  j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 j = 4 
i Region 
IPR 
protection
Government 
intervention
Government 
corruption 
Contract 
enforcement 
1 Beijing 1.45 0.1 0.65 0.24 
2 Tianjin 0.48 0.11 0.67 0.17 
3 Hebei -0.87 0.06 0.54 0.22 
4 Shanxi -1.23 0.02 0.62 0.1 
5 
Inner 
Mongolia -1.12 0.04 0.56 0.28 
6 Liaoning 0.13 0.09 0.63 0.18 
7 Jilin -0.5 0.1 0.76 0.1 
8 Heilongjiang -0.49 0.08 0.65 0.2 
9 Shanghai 0.88 0.07 0.37 0.25 
10 Jiangsu -0.15 0.11 0.44 0.23 
11 Zhejiang 0.47 0.1 0.45 0.22 
12 Anhui -1.4 0.15 0.63 0.29 
13 Fujian -0.14 0.1 0.51 0.33 
14 Jiangxi -1.35 0.07 0.54 0.2 
15 Shandong -0.27 0.05 0.52 0.32 
16 Henan -1.21 0.04 0.52 0.15 
17 Hubei -1.01 0.17 0.39 0.16 
18 Hunan -0.92 0.08 0.7 0.3 
19 Guangdong 0.6 0.05 0.6 0.22 
20 Guangxi -1.33 0.14 0.55 0.23 
21 Hainan -0.9 0.14 0.81 0.26 
22 Sichuan -0.96 0.13 0.68 0.27 
23 Guizhou -1.6 0.18 0.88 0.27 
24 Yunnan -1.26 0.1 0.59 0.31 
25 Shaanxi -0.9 0.09 0.47 0.23 
26 Gansu -1.65 0.1 0.67 0.41 
27 Qinghai -1.49 0 0.45 0.3 
28 Ningxia -0.92 0.08 0.45 0.17 
29 Xinjiang -0.99 0.14 0.59 0.35 
 Sum -18.65 2.69 16.89 6.96 
 Mean -0.64 0.09 0.58 0.24 
 S.D 0.81 0.04 0.12 0.07 
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Indicator Description Data source 
IPR Protection  The logarithm of the number of approved 
patents per capita. 
China Statistical Yearbook, 
(Du et al., 2008a) 
Government intervention 
 
The percentage of time enterprise managers 
spend dealing with government agencies and 
officials. 
Survey of China’s private 
enterprises, 1995-2002 
(Du et al., 2008a) 
Government corruption The proportion of private entrepreneurs 
answering yes to the question of whether stricter 
policies against government corruption are 
necessary in their region. 
Survey of China’s private 
enterprises, 1995-2002 
(Du et al., 2008a) 
Contract enforcement The proportion of private entrepreneurs 
answering affirmatively to the question of 
whether they would use the courts to resolve 
business disputes. 
Survey of China’s private 
enterprises, 1995-2002 
(Du et al., 2008a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
